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Earnings Management and Contest to the Control: 
An Analysis of European Family Firms 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: This paper analyzes the influence of large shareholders on earnings management in 
family-owned firms using a sample of firms from 11 European countries. We consider how the 
contest to the control of the largest shareholder and the existence of a controlling coalition in 
family-owned firms affect earnings management in these firms. We find that increased 
contestability of the control of the largest shareholder reduces earnings management in family-
owned firms. Our results also show that in firms in which the largest shareholder is a family, a 
second or third family shareholder increases discretionary accruals. 
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Earnings Management and Contest to the Control: 
An Analysis of European Family Firms 
 
I. Introduction 
Managers’ discretionary behavior is one of the areas of capital markets that have made the 
greatest contribution to our knowledge of accounting numbers (Beaver, 2002). Managers can 
improve or impair the quality of financial statements through a number of actions such as 
voluntary disclosure, the choice of accounting methods, and the estimation of accruals. Because 
motive for accrual management may be opportunistic, earnings management can be sometimes 
perceived as detrimental for the interest of some stakeholders (Beaver and Engel, 1996; Dechow 
and Skinner, 2000). 
Thus, research about earnings management is often linked to the mechanisms of corporate 
governance potentially affecting managerial discretionary behavior (Bedard and Johnstone, 
2004) and to the institutional framework (Burgstahler et al., 2006; Larcker et al., 2007; Leuz et 
al., 2003). For instance, the literature has studied the effect of the size and composition of the 
board of directors (Beasley, 1996; Peasnell et al., 2005; Xie et al., 2003), the audit committee 
(Defond and Jiambalvo, 1991; Klein, 2002), managerial ownership (Cheng and Warfield, 2005), 
external auditors (Becker et al., 1998; DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998), and institutional 
investors (Jiambalvo et al., 2002). 
We focus on earnings management in family-owned firms because these firms are 
particularly sensitive to the problems of corporate governance. In addition, family-owned firms 
play a significant role in Europe and all around the world. According to Faccio and Lang (2002), 
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44 percent of the firms in Western Europe are family controlled, and Claessens et al. (2000) find 
that over two-thirds of the East Asian firms are controlled by families or individuals. Although 
not as prevalent in the United States, Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that founding families are 
present in one-third of the S&P 500 corporations, and Villalonga and Amit (2006) show that 
family firms represent 37 percent of Fortune 500 firms. 
The relevance of family firms is not limited to their quantitative significance; they are also 
a suitable framework to analyze the distribution of the power. Although these firms are affected 
less severely by Agency Problem I, which arises from the separation of ownership and 
management, they are are often characterized by Agency Problem II, which results from the 
conflict  between controlling and noncontrolling shareholders (Ali et al., 2007; Villalonga and 
Amit, 2006). That is, when minority shareholders face the possibility of expropriation by large 
shareholders, the contest to the control of the dominant shareholders becomes a key issue 
(Lehman and Weigand, 2000, Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Volpin, 2002). 
We base our analysis both on the effects of discretionary accounting behavior and on the 
specific agency problems of family-owned firms. We examine how the distribution of the 
ownership and the contest to the control of the largest family shareholder impacts the earnings 
management of family-owned firms. Using a sample of 594 firms from 11 European countries, 
our results show that the distribution of the control among several block holders reduces earnings 
management in family firms. We also find that coalitions among families or individual 
shareholders reduce the quality of financial statements by triggering earnings management. 
The contribution of our paper is twofold. First, we are not aware of any study that examines 
the influence of shared control on earnings management; thus, we demonstrate a specific channel 
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through which ownership structure can modify earnings management. Second, as prior literature 
has focused primarily on data from a single country (mainly the United States), we expand the 
research to a multinational context. In so doing, we show that the influence of a controlling 
coalition is not a country-specific issue but, rather, is very common to a number of Western 
European firms. This multinational context also allows us to control for the characteristics of the 
legal and institutional setting of each country, which provides further insight on a multinational 
level. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop our 
hypotheses concerning the relation between abnormal accruals and the contest to the control of 
family shareholders. In Section III, we describe the sample and data. Section IV contains the 
research design and empirical results. We summarize and conclude in Section V.  
 
II. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
The influence of family ownership and control on the firm’s accounting choices remains a 
relatively unexplored topic. The most relevant literature is recent, not explicitly focused on the 
shared control of firms, and provides conflicting results. This mixed evidence seems to run 
parallel to the evidence concerning the effect of family ownership on the firm’s performance 
(Miller et al., 2007). The higher risk of minority expropriation by family controlling shareholders 
(Claessens et al., 2002; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2001; Maury and 
Pajuste, 2005) contrasts with a more long-term concern with the survival of the company and 
more commitment with the reputation of the family/firm (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Barontini 
and Caprio, 2005; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
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Two characteristics of family firms can influence corporate disclosure practices: ownership 
concentration and the possibility of executive entrenchment. First, the high managerial stake so 
common in family firms may provide managers with incentives to engage in earnings 
management to increase the value of the shares (Cheng and Warfield, 2005). Conversely, Ali et 
al. (2007) show that, compared with their nonfamily counterparts, family firms manipulate 
discretionary accruals less and are more skilled at interpreting earnings components to predict 
future cash flows. In the same vein, Wang (2006) reports a positive influence of the founding 
family ownership on earnings quality, which is consistent with the alignment effect of family 
ownership. 
Second, high ownership concentration in the hands of a small number of shareholders can 
result in executive entrenchment. Fan and Wong (2002) discuss two ways through which 
concentrated ownership reduces earnings informativeness. First, outside investors may perceive 
the accounting information reported by controlling owners to be self-interested, causing the 
reported earnings to lose credibility. Second, ownership concentration prevents leakage of 
proprietary information about the firms’ possible rent-seeking activities. This lose of 
informativeness of earnings is exacerbated when cash flow rights are separated from voting 
rights (Francis et al., 2005). Consistent with the theory of entrenchment (Morck et al., 1988), 
Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca (2007) show that the relation among insider ownership, 
discretionary accruals, and the informativeness of earnings is nonlinear, so that insiders’ attitude 
depends on their ability to control the firm and on the cost of extracting private benefits. 
Taken together, these results show a diverse portrait of the impact of family ownership on 
corporate disclosure. On the one hand, less separation between ownership and control leads to 
less manipulation of earnings for opportunistic reasons and, therefore, to better quality of 
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earnings forecasts. On the other hand, family ownership can lead to the development of informal 
relationships that may harm the credibility of or access to earnings information.  
Our intuition is that this evidence, which is seemingly inconsistent, can be explained on the 
basis of the interaction of family ownership with other characteristics of corporate governance. 
Despite various studies on the influence of corporate governance on accounting outcomes 
(Bedard and Johnstone, 2004; Farber, 2005; Larcker et al., 2007), little is known about how 
family ownership operates as a mechanism of corporate governance to modify the quality of 
financial statements, and the few studies existing have stressed how the interaction among family 
and individual shareholders affects the value of the firm. Consistent with the hypothesis that 
more severe agency problems are found at firms with large controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders, family-owned firms face a higher risk of expropriation by family shareholders. In 
such situations, the contest to the control of the largest shareholder becomes a key issue (Bloch 
and Hege, 2001; Edwards and Weichenrieder, 2004; Maury, 2006; Maury and Pajuste, 2005).  
If the largest shareholder faces greater contest and his or her control is more disputed, he or 
she must solicit a consensus with other shareholders to maintain the control necessary to make 
the main strategic decisions. Therefore, when the position of the largest shareholder is 
challenged, he or she may form control coalitions with other reference shareholders to reach the 
majority of the vote rights. Thus, the role of large shareholders and the formation of the 
controlling coalition within family firms are vital and can have a significant impact on the 
performance of the firm (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Bloch and Hege, 2001; Claessens et 
al., 2002; Gomes and Novaes, 2001). While these reference shareholders can join with the largest 
shareholder to help him or her retain control, they are also may prevent the largest shareholder 
from behaving opportunistically and reduce the private benefits he or she might extract. In other 
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words, when other reference shareholders intervene in the preparation of financial information, 
concealing or manipulating information by the largest shareholder becomes costly and more 
difficult. 
We assess the contest to the control of the largest shareholder to reduce the discretionary 
accruals, our empirical proxy for earnings management, by investigating whether more contested 
control reduces discretionary accruals and by comparing the results from family-owned firms 
with the results from nonfamily owned firms. Hence, we test the following hypothesis: 
H1: The distribution of ownership among several reference shareholders reduces earnings 
management more among family-own firms compared with nonfamily-owned firms 
due to the higher incentives for opportunistic behavior. 
The family nature of the largest shareholder and the degree to which his or her control is 
contested by other reference shareholders is not the only factor that influences earnings 
management: The nature of the other shareholders can also be relevant. Maury and Pajuste 
(2005) and Ball et al. (2003) suggest that family groups have a higher propensity to seek private 
benefits. Since many of the dynamics that apply to family shareholders also hold for large 
individual shareholders, family or individual shareholders can more easily achieve consensus to 
the detriment of the other shareholders. Conversely, in a firm whose largest shareholder is a 
family but the other reference shareholders are nonfamily members (i.e., nonfinancial 
corporations, institutional investors, banks, etc.), the connivance of interests becomes more 
difficult as do agreements to extract private benefits.  
A coalition formed by families faces lower costs of extracting private benefits than a 
coalition that includes an institutional investor or a bank that is under stricter supervision by 
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regulatory authorities, which, consequently, increases the costs of extracting private benefits. 
Thus, the possibility of agreement among family shareholders is more feasible. In other words, 
forming coalitions to expropriate minority shareholders among institutional investors is more 
difficult than among families or private shareholders. As far as accounting information is 
concerned, the more difficult the expropriation is, the less the need for earnings management to 
hinder the controlling shareholders from extracting private benefits.  
Accordingly, we set our second hypothesis: 
H2: A family or individual as a second or third shareholder has a positive influence on 
earnings management in the firms in which the largest shareholder is also a family or 
and individual.  
The transparency of financial statements is often affected by the legal and institutional 
setting (Haw et al., 2004). Preparers’ financial reporting incentives depend on the extent of 
political influences relative to market influences on their practices (Ball et al., 2000). Investor 
protection measures also must be taken into account because insiders, in an attempt to protect 
their private control benefits, may use earnings management to conceal firm performance from 
outsiders when investor protection is weak (Leuz et al., 2003). Likewise, Maury (2006) shows 
that the influence of family ownership is conditional on the protection of minority shareholders 
against family opportunism. Accordingly, we also control for the legal protection of each country 
through the classification provided by La Porta et al. (1998, 1999, 2000) 
  
-9-
III. Empirical design 
Sample 
We obtain our sample from two databases: data from financial statements (i.e., balance 
sheet and income and expenditures statement) and the market value of the firms come from the 
Compustat database, and information on the ownership structure of the firms comes from the 
Amadeus database. As shown in Table 1, the sample includes 594 firms from 11 European 
Union countries and contains 2,113 observations between 1996 and 2000.1 Although not 
balanced across countries, our sample is relatively balanced in terms of the legal origin of each 
financial system (359 firms in common law countries vs. 235 firms in civil law countries). 
<<TABLE1 ABOUT HERE>> 
Variables 
The dependent variable that proxies earnings management is the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (ABSDA). We present a more in-depth description of this variable in the 
following discussion on the empirical method. Total accruals (TA) are depend on the growth in 
total revenues (ΔREV) and the level of depreciable assets, which are defined as the gross level of 
property, plants, and equipment (GPPE). To avoid heteroskedasticity, the variables are scaled by 
total assets at book value. 
                                                 
1 We use a secondary database for the estimation of earnings management. This sample includes 11,736 
observations from the analyzed counties from Compustat. 
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To examine the contest to the control, we build an index to measure how the power of the 
largest shareholder can be contested (CONTEST), which is defined as the sum of the ownership 
of the second and the third largest shareholders relative to the ownership of the largest 
shareholder:2 that is, the higher the value of CONTEST, the more contested the largest 
shareholder can be. However, this variable not only depends on the difference between the 
largest and the other reference shareholders but also can be affected by the number of shares 
owned by the main shareholder.3 Thus, to reinforce CONTEST and avoid problems created by 
the size of largest owner’s holdings, we define a dummy variable, TC, which equals 1 when the 
cash flow rights of the largest shareholder are in the first tercile (i.e., the third of the firms with 
the highest values for the ownership held by the largest shareholder), and zero otherwise. This 
variable allows us to test the specific effect of largest owner share size on his or her ability and 
incentives to extract private benefits. 
To test the robustness of our results, we define two alternative measures of contest as 
variations of the Herfindahl index, HERF1 and HERF2. Previously used by Maury and Pajuste 
(2005), HERF1, which is measured by the sum of the squares of the differences between the first 
and the second largest ownership stakes and the second and third largest ownership stakes,4 
emphasizes the differences in the voting stakes among the three largest shareholders. HERF2, 
also employed by Maury and Pajuste, is defined as the sum of squares of the three largest 
                                                 
2 CONTEST = (C2+C3)/C1, where Ci is the cash flow rights of the first, second, and third shareholder; 5% is the 
lowest ownership proportion to be considered a reference shareholder. 
3 CONTEST has the same value for a firm in which C1 is 30%, C2 is 20%, and C3 is 15% as for a firm in which C1 is 
3%, C2 is 2%, and C3 is 1.5%. 
4 HERF1 = (C1 – C2)2 +(C2 – C3)2, where Ci is the cash flow rights of the first, second, and third shareholder. 
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ownership stakes.5 As the value of both Herfindahl indexes increases, the concentration of 
largest shareholder’s power also increases, and, consequently, contest to the manager’s power 
decreases. 
The definition of the family nature of the firm is key to this study. According to Villalonga 
and Amit (2006), the family nature of a firm depends on three aspects: ownership, control, and 
management. Because the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders is likely to be 
most costly in family firms, we focus on ownership, paying particular attention to the distribution 
of ownership. Consequently, we define two dummy variables, DFAM2 and DFAM23, depending 
on the characteristics of the two largest secondary shareholders: DFAM2 equals 1 when the 
second owner is a family, and zero otherwise; and DFAM23 equals 1 when both the second and 
the third shareholders are members of a family, and zero otherwise. Following Barontini and 
Caprio (2006), we classify reference shareholders as families, institutional investors, the state, 
banks, and nonfinancial firms. We also take into account the percentage of cash flow rights of 
the first, second, and third largest shareholders (C1, C2, and C3, respectively). 
To address the legal protection of the shareholders other than the largest shareholder, we 
use a dummy variable, LEGAL, which equals 1 when the firm belongs to a common law 
country, and zero otherwise.6 In employing this variable, which links the legal and institutional 
framework of each country to the legal protection of shareholders, we make the assumption that 
shareholders’ rights are better protected in common law countries (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). 
                                                 
5 HERF2 = C12 + C22 + C32, where Ci is the cash flow rights of the first, second, and third shareholder. 
6 Although Djankov et al. (2005) provide a corrected measure for the legal protection of minority shareholders, it 
applies to legal changes made after 2003, so we do not use it as our sample dates back prior to 2003.  
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Finally, as control variables, we include firm size, defined as the log of total assets 
(LOGAST); leverage ratio (LEV), measured as the debt-to-equity ratio; and payout ratio (DIV). 
LEV and DIV act as traditional mechanisms of corporate discipline and have been commonly 
included in the research on earnings management (Ahmed et al., 2002; Dechow and Skinner, 
2000; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994), thus making our results comparable to 
previous research. We control for some potential industry effects by defining a set of ten dummy 
variables based on the one-digit SIC codes. We also control for time effects with a set of yearly 
dummy variables. The Appendix provides complete definitions of all variables. 
 
Empirical method 
We divide our methodology into two stages. First, we estimate total accruals and separate 
the discretionary from the nondiscretionary component. Second, we regress the discretionary or 
abnormal accruals against the variables of ownership structure in family firms to test their effect 
on managers’ discretionary accounting decisions.  
Total accruals are estimated according to Jones’ (1991) model (Phillips et al., 2003). This 
widely used model is based on the idea that changes in a firm’s economic condition and 
managers’ discretion result in accruals. Although several alternative models identify earnings 
management (e.g., Dechow et al., 1995; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Kothari et al., 2005), Jones’ 
model performs better than its time-series counterparts in detecting earnings management 
(Bartov et al., 2000). This performance is improved, and even more consistent estimations are 
achieved, when suitable statistical methodology (i.e., panel data) is implemented.  
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Total accruals are the difference between results and cash flow of the firm’s ordinary 
activities. In Jones’ (1991) model, nondiscretionary accruals are calculated by regressing total 
accruals (TA) against the growth in total revenues (ΔREV) and the gross level of property, plants 
and equipment (GPPE). Nevertheless, the possible mean reversion or momentum in earnings or 
in turnover necessitates the inclusion of a measure of performance (Kothari et al., 2005; Louis 
and Robinson, 2005). Accordingly, we incorporate ROA as a possible factor affecting total 
accruals because it provides better estimations than other measures of operational performance or 
return of stocks (Barber and Lyon, 1996; Ikenberry et al., 1995; Lyon et al., 1999). 
Thus, total accruals are dependent on ΔREV, GPPE, and ROA as expressed in equation (1): 
 it 0 1 it 2 it 3 it i itTA = α + α ΔREV + α GPPE + α ROA + η + ε , (1) 
where the subscripted i identifies the individual and the subscripted t identifies the time period; 
ηi is the term of fixed effects and can include several effects that are specific to the firm and 
constant through time; and εit is the random error of each observation, which captures the 
possible misspecification of measurement in the independent variables as well as any other 
omitted independent variable. 
The estimated values of TA in equation (1) are considered the normal accruals given the 
sales of the firm and the depreciation of the assets. Consequently, the errors of the regression are 
the abnormal or discretionary accruals (DA) because that they are not motivated by either sales 
or the depreciation of assets and they could arise due to the discretionary decisions of managers.  
Therefore, DA is defined as follows: 
 it it it 0 1 it 2 it 3 itABSDA = DA  = TA (a + a ΔREV + a GPPE + a ROA )− , (2) 
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where ai is the estimated coefficient of αi. 
In the second stage of our study, we examine the effect of the contest to the largest family 
shareholder on earnings management. Consistent with the literature on earnings management 
(Dechow, 1994; Dechow and Skinner, 2000), we introduce the lagged value of the dependent 
variable (DAit-1) as an explanatory variable because earnings management tends to smooth 
earnings, so it is likely to be conditioned by accounting decisions in previous years. Our model, 
which includes the control variables, is expressed as follows: 
ABSDAit = α1+ β1·ABSDAit–1+ (β2+α2·TC)·CONTESTit+ (β3+α3·DFAM2)·C2it+ 
(β4+α4·DFAM23)·C3it +  +β5·LEGALit +  β6·LEVit + β7·LOGASTit + β8·DIVit +  ηi+ ηt 
+ εit, (3) 
ηt stands for the time effect and includes macroeconomic effects that affect all the companies in 
the same period in a cross-sectional manner.  
We base our empirical analysis on the econometrics of panel data, which is the most 
suitable method when data are combined from different firms over several years. Panel data 
methodology also allows us to control for the unobservable constant heterogeneity (i.e., fixed 
effects) and provides us with more efficient estimators than cross-sectional models (Arellano, 
2003; Baltagi, 1996). 
We estimate Jones’ (1991) model, as stated in equation (1), by the within-groups method 
because TA is exogenous. Conversely, equation (3) poses a problem of endogeneity due to the 
introduction of lagged dependent variables among the set of explanatory variables. To address 
this problem, we estimate our model using Blundell and Bond’s (1998) and Bond’s (2002) panel 
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data system estimator, which is an improved version (based on the suitability of the instruments) 
of the generalized method of moments. Given the possibility that weak instruments could induce 
poor asymptotic precision (Alonso-Borrego and Arellano, 1999), a generalized method of 
moments system estimator provides the most efficient estimates. In this context, the choice of 
instruments becomes a key decision, and we use all the right-hand-side variables up to three 
years lagged. 
The consistency of the estimates depends critically on the absence of second-order serial 
autocorrelation in the residuals and on the validity of the instruments (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
Accordingly, we report the Auto(2) test. To test the validity of the instruments, we use the 
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, which allows us to test the absence of a correlation 
between the instruments and the error term and, therefore, to check the validity of the selected 
instruments. We present two Wald tests: z1 and z2, which report the joint significance of the 
reported coefficients and the industry dummies, respectively. We also report three t-tests for 
linear restrictions for the interacted dummies: t2, t3, and t4, which test for the significance of β2 
+ α2, β3 + α3, and β4 + α4, respectively. 
 
IV. Results 
Descriptive analysis 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for our sample. Because the family nature of the firm 
is a relevant feature, we also provide a mean comparison test and the associated p-values. As 
expected, contestability differs significantly across firms, with family firms reporting less 
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contested control; that is, in family firms, CONTEST is significantly lower, and both HERF1 and 
HERF2 are significantly higher. These differences in contestability may be due higher ownership 
concentration as suggested by C1 and C2. Interestingly, there are no systematic differences in 
terms of discretionary accruals, and the null hypothesis of equal means across subsamples cannot 
be rejected either for DA or ABSDA. These findings are consistent with our theoretical 
framework and the uncertain impact of family ownership on earnings management. 
<<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>> 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation matrix among the variables. As expected, 
CONTEST is negatively and significantly correlated with HERF1 and HERF2 as they are 
opposite measures of control concentration. We also emphasize the close correlation between 
ABSDA and the contestability variables. We provide the variance inflation factor (VIF) to test 
for multicollinearity. Our VIF scores are below 2, and, thus, we confirm that collinearity does 
not skew our results (Belsley et al., 2004; Kutner et al., 2005) 
<<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE>> 
To test our first hypothesis regarding the impact of ownership distribution among reference 
shareholders on earnings management, we examine the differences in discretionary accruals 
depending on the degree of contestability. We split the sample according to the mean value of 
our three measures of contestability (CONTEST, HERF1, and HERF2) and report the mean 
values of ABSDA in Table 4. We find that higher contestability is negatively related to ABSDA 
and that this relation is consistent for family firms regardless of the criteria used to divide the 
sample.  
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<<TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE>> 
Explanatory analysis 
Given the key role of our measure of earnings management, we calculate ABSDA using 
three different models: the Jones (1991) cross-sectional model, the cross-sectional Jones 
modified model (Dechow et al., 1995), and the cross-sectional ROA-adjusted Jones model 
(Kothari et al., 2005).  The results of the estimations of the three models are shown in Table 5. 
Since all of them provide analogous results, the estimates of equation (3) will be only reported 
for the ROA-adjusted model.7 
Table 5 reports the results of the estimation of the earnings management models. For each 
model, we estimate 1,033 industry-year–country regressions.8 We report the mean, standard 
deviation, and minimum, maximum, and median coefficients. For the Jones (1991) model, 
shown in Panel A, the coefficient of ΔREV is generally negative, with a mean (median) of –0.02 
(0.00) and a mean (median) t-test of –0.09 (0.04). The results are statistically significant in 286 
of 1,033 regressions. As expected, the coefficient of GPPE is usually negative, with a mean 
                                                 
7 This model was selected on the basis of the t-test for means according to Kothari et al. (2005). We run two tests in 
250 randomly defined subsamples of 100 firms: The first test relates to the null hypothesis that discretionary 
accruals are no-negative, and the second test addresses the null hypothesis that discretionary accruals are no-
positive. t-statistics are computed as the mean of each subsample divided between the estimation error once 
standardized by the squared root of the number of observations. This value is compared with a t-distribution with 
n-1 degrees of freedom. The ROA-adjusted Jones model (Kothari et al., 2005) is the best specified because it gives 
the lowest rates of reject of the null hypothesis of lack of earnings management. 
8 We split the sample by two SIC-codes digits. As previously explained, estimations have been run with a sample of 
11,736 observations from Compustat database from 1997 to 2000. 
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(median) of –0.46 (–0.42) and mean (median) t-test of –1.10 (–0.46). The coefficient is 
statistically significant in 261 of 1,033 regressions. The significance of both coefficients are 
analogous to similar research. The mean (median) of the adjusted-R2 coefficient is 0.46 (0.42), 
suggesting that the model has substantial explanatory power. 
 
<<TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE>> 
 
Panel B of Table 5 shows that the difference between the growth of turnover and the 
increase in receivables (∆REV – ∆REC) in the Jones modified model (Dechow et al., 1995) has a 
positive coefficient, with a mean (median) of 0.003 (0.00) and a mean (median) t-test of 0.43 
(0.10). The coefficient is positive in 290 of 1,033 regressions. The coefficient of GPPE is 
generally negative with a mean (median) of –0.05 (–0.01) and a mean (median) t-test of –1.85 (–
0.45). The coefficient is statistically significant in 269 of 1,033 regressions. This model also 
explains a significant part of the variation in total accruals as the mean (median) of the adjusted-
R2 coefficient is once again 0.46 (0.42). 
Panel C of Table 5 shows that the coefficient of ΔREV in the ROA-adjusted Jones model 
(Kothari et al., 2005) is positive with a mean (median) of 0.24 (0.00) and a mean (median) t-test 
of 0.10 (0.06). The coefficient is significant in 232 of 1,033 industry–year–country regressions. 
The coefficient of GPPE is usually negative with a mean (median) of –0.09 (–0.01) and a mean 
(median) t-test of –0.78 (–0.54). The coefficient is significant in 217 of 1,033 regressions. The 
ROA coefficient has a mean (median) of –0.19 (–0.00) and a mean (median) t-test of –1.09 
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(-0.14). This ROA-adjusted model has more explanatory power than its counterparts, as 
indicated by the mean (median) of the adjusted-R2 coefficient of 0.71 (0.82). 
From these results, we are able to compute the discretionary component of total accruals 
(DA) as shown in equation (2). We use the absolute value (ABSDA) as a proxy of earnings 
management and run differentiated regressions for family versus nonfamily firms as reported in 
Tables 5 and 6.  
<<TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE>> 
The results, as shown in columns 1 through 3 in Table 6, support Hypothesis 1, which 
states that the distribution of ownership among several reference shareholders reduces earnings 
management among family-own firms compared with nonfamily-owned firms due to the higher 
incentives for opportunistic behavior. We find that more contested corporate control 
(CONTEST) significantly reduces abnormal accruals in family firms, whereas it has the opposite 
effect in the firms whose largest shareholder is not a family (column 1). This result is robust to 
alternative specifications of contestability as shown in columns 2 and 3. If we use HERF1 and 
HERF2, which account for the concentration of control, we find a positive influence on earnings 
management in family firms and a negative impact in nonfamily firms. 
This inference is corroborated by the effect of the stake owned by the second and third 
largest shareholders (C2 and C3). Both variables are negatively and significantly related to 
ABSDA (columns 1–3). Thus, the greater involvement of these shareholders reduces the control 
of the largest shareholder and, therefore, limits his or her ability to make discretionary 
accounting decisions. 
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The second hypothesis addresses the effect of the possible agreements among reference 
shareholders when the second and third largest shareholders are families. The results in Table 6 
show that although C2 and C3 negatively affect earnings management, the effect turns positive 
when these shareholders are families. Specifically, the interacted variables C2·DFAM2 and 
C3·DFAM23 have a significant positive effect on ABSDA, which means that in the firms in 
which the largest shareholder is a family, higher ownership in the hands of a second family 
shareholder (C2·DFAM2) or both a second and a third family shareholder (C3·DFAM23) 
provides higher incentives to manage earnings. 
To perform a test of the joint effect of C2 and C2·DFAM2, we report the linear constraints 
tests, t3 (t4), relative to the joint significance of β3 + α3 (β4 + α4) coefficients, namely, the 
ownership of the second (third) largest shareholder and the interaction with his or her family 
nature. Both tests are significant. 
Regarding the control variables, as expected, the legal and institutional framework has a 
negative effect on earnings management, but this effect applies only to nonfamily firms. 
Surprisingly, financial leverage is positively related to discretionary accruals. This result deviates 
from previous research but could be due to systematic differences in the leverage ratio between 
common and civil law countries so that its impact is subsumed in the institutional effect. Another 
explanation could be based on a possible complementary use of dividends and leverage as 
mechanisms of control, so that dividends partially reflect the influence of leverage. 
To check robustness and to test further the impact of control concentration in family firms, 
we run new regressions focused on family-owned firms as reported in Table 7. The most 
important feature of these new analyses is the introduction of TC, a dummy variable, which 
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equals 1 when the cash flow rights of the largest shareholder are in the first tercile, and zero 
otherwise. By interacting TC with CONTEST, we can examine the specific effect of 
contestability in the firms with the most concentrated ownership structure. 
<<TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE>> 
We report the simplest version of our analysis in the first column of Table 7. Results 
corroborate the negative influence of the contest to the control on earnings management even 
when CONTEST is isolated from the influence of C2 and C3. In column 2, we introduce the 
interacted variable CONTEST·TC. Its negative and significant coefficient stresses how the 
contest to the control plays a significant role in the family firms with the most concentrated 
ownership structure. That is, more concentrated ownership in family firms gives the managers 
additional incentives to entrench themselves and additional means to extract private benefits 
through earnings management. 
The results reported in columns 3 through 5 of Table 7 concern the influence of the second 
and third largest shareholders in family firms along with the specific effect of contestability in  
family firms with the most concentrated ownership structure. Column 3 (column 4) shows the 
results of our tests of the effect of the second (third) reference shareholder; in column 5, we 
introduce the combined effect of the second and third shareholder.  
Consistent with previous results, our findings show that as the stakes of the second and 
third largest shareholder (i.e., C2 and C3) increase, the control of the largest shareholder also 
increases, and, thus, earnings management decreases. Conversely, the interacted variables (i.e., 
the specific effects of ownership when the reference shareholders are also families) point at a 
possible entente among family shareholders to expropriate nonfamily shareholders. Furthermore, 
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the absolute value of the coefficients of C2·DFAM2 and C3·DFAM23, respectively, exceeds the 
absolute values of the coefficients of C2 and C3. In turn, we find a net amplifying effect. This 
inference is supported by the tests of linear constraints t3 and t4, given that they show that the 
coefficients β3 + α3 and β4 + α4 are both significant. Consequently, families as second or third 
largest shareholders in family firms offset the positive effect of higher ownership stakes for other 
reference shareholders in terms of the quality of the financial statements. 
We provide the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions in both Table 6 and 7. This test 
allows us to accept the null hypothesis of validity of the instruments in our estimations. 
Additionally, the Auto(2) test suggests the lack of second-order serial correlation. In all the 
estimates, we control for time effects with dummy variables.  
We run several additional models. First, we consider alternative measures of firm size and 
of financial leverage. Second, we introduce industry dummy variables based on two-digits SIC 
codes. These estimates (not reported) corroborate our previously reported results and are 
available from the authors on request.  
IV. Conclusions 
In recent years a number of studies have emphasized an agency problem that arises 
between large, controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. In firms with a concentrated 
ownership structure, controlling shareholders may have incentives to expropriate the small—
albeit larger in number—minority shareholders. This problem, which is widely spread among 
European firms, is exacerbated by family ownership because family members have more 
incentives than other types of investors to form coalitions to extract private benefits. 
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Research regarding the influence of family ownership on earnings management is not 
conclusive. Our paper takes a step forward by focusing on the influence of contest to the control 
of the largest shareholder on earnings management in family firms. Consistent with analogous 
research about the relevance of the contestability of the largest shareholder on the firm’s value, 
we find that contest to control plays a critical role in improving the transparency of financial 
statements. More specifically, our results show that, in family-owned firms, the absence of 
contestability of control is positively related to earnings management, whereas this finding does 
not hold for nonfamily owned firms. Moreover, the presence of another individual or family as 
the second or third largest reference shareholder has an amplifying effect on earnings 
management in the firms in which the largest shareholder is a family. 
Our results point to the shared control among several reference shareholders as a balanced 
solution between two extremes: the lack of control often found in a widely disperse ownership 
structure and the discretionary behavior typical of firms with only one controlling shareholder. 
Especially in family firms, the need for the consensus of family members with other reference 
shareholders may reduce the use of private information and improve the quality of the 
accounting information. 
Our findings suggest several directions for future research. A more complete description of 
the controlling coalition would of interest. We base our work solely on the ownership of the 
reference shareholders, but the analysis could be broadened to include the involvement of the 
family members in firm management. Another direction for further study would be an analysis of 
how the composition of the controlling coalition interacts with other governance mechanisms 
such as the board of directors. Finally, some particular characteristics of the legal regime could 
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be analyzed in more depth to identify the issues of the institutional setting potentially affecting 
the quality of the financial statement. 
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Appendix. Definition of variables 
Abbreviations Variable Definition 
C1 Ownership concentration  Ownership held by the largest shareholder 
C2 Ownership concentration  Ownership held by the second largest shareholder 
C3 Ownership concentration  Ownership held by the third largest shareholder 
CONTEST Contestability of the power of 
the largest shareholder 
(C2 + C3)/C1 
TC Tercile of ownership 
concentration  
Equals 1 if the ownership of the largest shareholder is in the tercile 
of the highest C1 in the sample, and zero otherwise 
HERF1 Lack of contestability of the 
power of the largest shareholder
(C1 – C2)2 + (C2 – C3)2 
HERF2 Lack of contestability of the 
power of the largest shareholder
C12 + C22 + C32 
DFAM2 Nature of the second 
shareholder 
Equals 1 when the second largest shareholder is a family or an 
individual, and zero otherwise 
DFAM23 Nature of the second and third 
shareholders 
Equals 1 when both the second and the third largest shareholders 
are families or individuals, and zero otherwise 
LEGAL Institutional effect Equals 1 if the firms belong to the Anglo-Saxon corporate system, 
and zero otherwise 
LOGAST Size of the firm Log of total assets 
LEV Financial leverage  Debt book value/Equity book value 
DIV Dividend payout Dividends/Equity 
TA Total accruals (ΔNonmonetary current assets – ΔNonmonetary current liabilities 
+ amortization expense)/Total assets 
DA Discretionary accruals Error of equation (1): 
it 0 1 it 2 it 3 it i it
TA = α + α × ΔREV + α × GPPE + α × ROA + η + ε  
ABSDA Discretionary accruals Absolute value of DA 
ΔREV Growth in revenues Relative increase in total revenues 
GPPE Gross property, plant and 
equipment 
Gross property, plant, and equipment/Total assets 
ΔREC Growth in receivables Relative increase in receivables 
ROA Return on assets Gross income/Total assets 
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Table 1: Composition of the sample by countries 
Country Firms Observations 
Austria 2 5 
Belgium 9 23 
Denmark 18 68 
Finland 12 39 
France 122 348 
Germany 45 136 
Great Britain  359 1,379 
Greece 2 4 
Spain  30 121 
Sweden 34 89 
The Netherlands 25 97 
Total 594 2,113 
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Table 2: Main descriptive statistics of the sample  
This table provides the mean, median, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum value of the main variables. 
C1, C2, and C3 are the ownership held by the first, second and third largest shareholders, respectively; CONTEST is 
a measure of contestability; HERF1 and HERF2 are measures of lack of contestability; LEV is the ratio between 
debt and equity; LOGAST is the log of total assets; DIV the ratio between dividend payments and equity; TA is total 
accruals; GPPE is gross plant, property, and equipment; ΔREV is the relative change in total revenues; DA is 
discretionary accruals; and ABSDA is the absolute value of discretionary accruals. The p-value is the highest level 
of significance to reject the null hypothesis of equal means between both subsamples.  
 
 Mean 
 Total 
Family 
firms 
Nonfamily 
firms p-value  Std. dev. Median Min. Max. 
C1 0.254  0.260 0.200 0.002 0.148 0.235 0.018 0.510 
C2 0.131  0.133 0.112 0.099 0.093 0.100 0.010 0.500 
C3 0.075  0.074 0.074 0.987 0.055 0.062 0.000 0.330 
CONTEST 0.984  0.965 1.139 0.010 0.505 0.947 0.086 2.000 
HERF1 0.041  0.042 0.023 0.010 0.055 0.014 0.000 0.250 
HERF2 0.121  0.124 0.083 0.006 0.112 0.080 0.001 0.500 
LOGAST 5.351  5.322 5.602 0.302 2.022 4.839 0.161 11.288 
LEV 0.312 0.317 0.310 0.823 0.215 0.319 0.000 0.909 
DIV 0.056 0.055 0.058 0.804 0.102 0.040 0.000 1.386 
TA 0.043 0.043 0.037 0.675 0.113 0.059 –0.552 0.518 
GPPE 0.642 0.645 0.613 0.547 0.396 0.601 0.000 2.366 
ΔREV 0.219 0.136 0.251 0.357 0.333 0.102 –3.412 1.770 
ROA 0.074 0.067 0.073 0.033 0.049 0.060 0.000 0.557 
DA –0.033 –0.031 –0.045 0.509 0.151 –0.026 –0.682 1.598 
ABSDA 0.113 0.091 0.102 0.527 0.317 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Table 3: Pearson correlation matrix and variance inflation factors 
This table provides the coefficients of correlation (p-value) among variables and variance inflation factor to test the absence of multicollinearity. ABSDA is the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals; CONTEST is a measure of contestability; HERF1 and HERF2 are measures of lack of contestability; C2 and C3 are the 
ownership held by the second and third largest shareholders, respectively; LOGAST is the log of total assets; and LEV is the ratio between debt and equity. The 
p-value is the highest level of significance to reject the null hypothesis of correlation among variables. 
 
ABSDA CONTEST HERF1 HERF2 C2 C3 LOGAST LEV 
CONTEST 0.0951        
 (0.0003)        
HERF1 –0.1360 –0.6310       
 (0.0000) (0.0000)       
HERF2 –0.2053 –0.3976 0.7818      
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)      
C2 –0.1980 0.0282 0.3384 0.7901     
 (0.0000) (0.2866) (0.0000) (0.0000)     
C3 –0.0751 0.3153 –0.1158 0.3778 0.5154    
 (0.0046) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)    
LOGAST –0.1369 –0.1003 0.0324 0.0352 –0.0061 –0.1223   
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.2222) (0.1846) (0.8175) (0.0000)   
LEV –0.0126 0.0270 –0.0234 –0.0308 –0.0411 –0.0445 0.2559  
 (0.5639) (0.3086) (0.3769) (0.2453) (0.1213) (0.0930) (0.0000)  
DIVE –0.0158 0.0312 –0.1062 –0.1512 –0.1439 –0.1049 0.0432 –0.0086 
 (0.4698) (0.2397) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0481) (0.6935) 
VIF  0.422 0.090 0.036 0.123 0.308 0.871 0.905 
Table 4: Discretionary accruals according to firm ownership and level of contestability  
This table provides the absolute value of discretionary component of total accruals (ABSDA) according to the 
degree of contestability to the first shareholder (high vs. low contestability). The degree of contestability is 
segmented according to the mean value of CONTEST, HERF1, and HERF2. The p-value is the highest level of 
significance to reject the null hypothesis of equal means between high and low contestability. 
 
 CONTEST   HERF1    HERF2  
 
High 
ABSDA  
Low 
ABSDA p-value
 High 
ABSDA 
Low 
ABSDA p-value
 High 
ABSDA  
Low 
ABSDA p-value
Family firms 0.083 0.102 0.072 0.099 0.140 0.023 0.096 0.143 0.008 
Nonfamily 
firms 
0.094 0.110 0.510 0.073 0.113 0.000 0.102 0.062 0.000 
Table 5: Estimation of total accruals 
This table shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum and median coefficient, t-statistics and adjusted-R2 coefficient of the cross-sectional 
regressions of Jones model (Panel A), cross-sectional Jones modified model (Panel B), and cross-sectional return on assets (ROA)-adjusted Jones model (Panel 
C). The dependent variable is total accruals scaled by total assets (TA) and the explanatory variables are the relative change in total revenues (ΔREV), the 
relative change in receivables (ΔREC), ROA, and the proportion of gross property, plant and equipment over total assets (GPPE). 
 
Panel A: Jones (1991) crossed-sectional model 
  Intercept ∆REV  GPPE ROA  
  No. obs. Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Adj. R2 
Mean 11.37 0.00 0.39 –0.02 –0.09 –0.46 –1.10  — — 0.46 
Std. dev. 15.71 0.30 6.54 8.22 4.69 0.32 7.91  — — 0.32 
Mín. 7 –3.93 –16.46 –93.64 –93.58 0.0004 –57.03  — — 0.0004 
Max. 156 2.07 42.60 87.05 26.13 1.00 21.80  — — 1.00 
Median 11 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04 –0.42 –0.46  — — 0.42 
Panel B: Jones modified crossed-sectional model (Dechow et al., 1995) 
   Intercept  ∆REV – ∆REC   GPPE  ROA  
  No. obs. Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Adj. R2 
Mean 11.37 0.01 1.24   0.003 0.43  –0.05 –1.85  — — 0.46 
Std. dev. 15.71 0.33 22.41  0.63 11.06  0.48 19.74  — — 0.32 
Mín. 7 –2.97 –16.88  –9.80 –96.68  –8.87 –66.62  — — 0.0001 
Max. 156 6.91 57.46  9.00 68.40  5.04 22.80  — — 1.00 
Median 11 0.00 0.02  0.00 0.10  –0.01 –0.45  — — 0.42 
Panel C: ROA-Adjusted Jones model (Kothari et al., 2005) 
   Intercept ∆REV  GPPE ROA  
  No. obs. Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Adj. R2 
Mean 11.37 –0.02 –0.29  0.24 0.10  –0.09 –0.78  –0.19 –1.09  0.71 
Std. dev. 15.71 0.92 7.22  5.96 22.93  1.01 4.79  5.99 18.17  0.30 
Mín. 7 –26.34 –89.80  –13.50 –86.43  –15.25 –70.73  –41.05 –39.31  0.01 
Max. 156 4.34 76.44  80.09 79.06  13.87 61.74  31.06 22.92  1.00 
Median 11 0.00 –0.09   0.00 0.06   –0.01 –0.54   0.00 –0.14   0.82 
Table 6: Results of the generalized method of moments estimations  
This table provides the estimated coefficients (t-statistic) from the system estimator of the generalized method of 
moments estimation. The dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABSDA). The 
dependent variables are defined in the Appendix. We control for time and institutional effects. Auto(2) is a test of 
second order serial autocorrelation of the residuals under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. t2, t3, and t4 
are tests for linear restrictions under the null hypothesis of no significance. z1 and z2 are Wald tests of the joint 
significance of the reported coefficients and time dummy variables, respectively, asymptotically distributed as χ2 
under the null hypothesis of no significance (degrees of freedom). The Hansen test is a test of overidentifying 
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and 
the error term (degrees of freedom). *** denotes 99% confidence level. ** denotes 95% confidence level. * denotes 
90% confidence level. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Family firms 
Nonfamily 
firms 
 Family firms Nonfamily firms 
 Family firms Nonfamily firms 
ABSDAt–1 0.571*** 0.140*** 0.544*** 0.072*** 0.562*** 0.074*** 
 (7.97) (5.03) (7.57) (3.47) (7.96) (3.64) 
CONTEST –0.045* 0.055***     
 (–1.84) (2.82)     
HERF1   0.725** –0.617**   
   (2.51) (–2.27)   
HERF2     0.381* –0.422*** 
     (1.84) (–2.67) 
C2 –0.799*** 0.506 –0.818*** 0.376 –1.091*** 0.654** 
 (–2.77) (1.40) (–3.23) (1.52) (–2.75) (2.53) 
C2·DFAM2 0.394* –0.656* 0.157** 0.492* 0.272* 0.449* 
 (1.61) (–1.90) (2.46) (1.81) (1.78) (1.55) 
C3 –0.525* 0.393 –0.713** 0.209 –0.389* 0.307 
 (–1.67) (0.81) (2.01) (0.43) (–1.83) (0.63) 
C3·DFAM23 0.590* 0.677 0.142** 0.455 0.304* 0.563 
 (1.85) (0.47) (2.22) (0.37) (1.71) (0.45) 
LOGAST –0.008 0.000 0.001 0.002 –0.002 0.003 
 (–0.66) (–0.01) (0.09) (0.54) (–0.21) (1.32) 
LEV –0.062 –0.071 –0.022*** 0.053 –0.050*** 0.041 
 (–1.14) (–1.45) (–0.34) (1.12) (–0.84) (0.89) 
DIV 0.231* 0.060 0.309** 0.154 0.259** 0.081 
 (1.80) (0.41) (2.38) (0.98) (2.04) (0.53) 
Institutional effect  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Time effect  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 581 1,098 581 1,098 581 1,098 
Auto(2) –1.22 –0.56 –1.19 –0.86 –1.21 –0.95 
t2 –1.93* –0.31 –1.74* 2.29** –2.57** 2.92 
t3 1.77* 0.64 –2.92*** 0.53 1.86* 0.62 
t4 9.69(13)*** 10.58(13)*** 9.84(13)*** 10.67(13)*** 10.54(13)*** 19.2(13)*** 
z1 4.68(2)*** 2.4(2)* 2.53(2)** 2.45(2)* 2.85(2)* 2.97(2)* 
z2 22.49 (24) 23.75(30) 20.98(24) 25.79(30) 21.62(24) 25.89(30) 
Hansen test 22.49 (24) 23.75(30) 20.98(24) 25.79(30) 21.62(24) 25.89(30) 
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Table 7: Results of the generalized method of moments estimations (sensitivity analysis)  
This table provides the estimated coefficients (t-statistic) from the system estimator of the generalized method of 
moments estimation. The dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABSDA). The 
dependent variables are defined in the Appendix. We control for time and institutional effects. Auto(2) is a test of 
second order serial autocorrelation of the residuals under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. t2, t3 and t4 are 
tests for linear restrictions under the null hypothesis of no significance. z1 and z2 are Wald tests of the joint 
significance of the reported coefficients and time dummy variables, respectively, asymptotically distributed as χ2 
under the null hypothesis of no significance (degrees of freedom). The Hansen test is a test of overidentifying 
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and 
the error term (degrees of freedom). *** denotes 99% confidence level. ** denotes 95% confidence level. * denotes 
90% confidence level. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ABSDAt–1 0.788*** 0.515*** 0.582*** 0.533*** 0.569*** 
(16.37) (10.88) (11.86) (10.18) (11.10) 
CONTEST –0.051*** –0.033* –0.055*** –0.044** –0.043** 
(–2.69) (–1.81) (–3.05) (–2.43) (–2.30) 
CONTEST·TC  –0.060*** –0.080** –0.135*** –0.110*** 
 (–2.62) (–1.99) (–5.48) (–3.10) 
C2   –0.151**  –0.016* 
  (–2.23)  (–1.71) 
C2·DFAM2   0.393**  0.136** 
  (2.15)  (1.98) 
C3    –0.716*** –0.700** 
   (–3.50) (–2.47) 
C3·DFAM23    0.832*** 0.987* 
   (3.26) (1.80) 
LOGAST –0.008 –0.005 0.006 0.019** 0.021** 
(–1.21) (–0.80) (0.79) (2.50) (2.55) 
LEV –0.068 –0.035 –0.058* –0.090*** –0.122*** 
(–1.1) (–0.63) (–1.62) (–2.38) (–3.11) 
DIV 0.048 0.176 0.357** 0.419*** 0.329* 
(0.31) (1.37) (1.98) (2.83) (1.89) 
Institutional effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 581 581 581 581 581 
Auto(2) –1.21 –1.23 –1.21 –1.14 –1.13 
t2  –2.81*** –3.32*** –4.66*** –3.32*** 
t3   1.82*  2.07** 
t4    3.74*** 3.65*** 
z1 59.15(8)*** 41.3(9)*** 33.99(12)*** 35.94(12)*** 34.17(14)***
z2 2.78(2)** 2.83(2)** 4.25(2)* 2.81(2)* 2.37(2)* 
Hansen test 15.00(18) 24.03(23) 19.04(24) 24.24(30) 25.21(28) 
 
